The Munich Air Disaster 1958

Written by Mike Kemble (Dec 2002) from the book Air Disasters by Stanley Stewart

Back in England on that Saturday afternoon the decision had already been taken to proceed with the days sporting events, although of course, the United game with Wolves had to be cancelled. A 2 minute silence was observed at all grounds, including the Football Association and Rugby matches. Flags were flown at half mast at all grounds with players wearing black arm bands and the press black ties. Emotions were running high and many team players felt that they should not have been asked to play. That evening Captain Thain and his crew returned to London. In Munich the weekend was blessed with warm weather unprecedented for the time of year with clear skies and bright sunshine. A BEA engineering team, acting on behalf of the British Government, carried out a thorough inspection of the engines and reported that, as suspected, no malfunction had occurred. On the Sunday the German authorities, without further ado, removed the wreckage and quickly sold it for scrap. The weekend closed with the good news that Matt Busby, although still dangerously ill, had been taken off the danger list.

Daily Herald 7th February 1958 (Image shows Bill Foulkes, Peter Howard ( Daily Mail) and Harry Gregg)

By the morning of February 10^th preparations were complete for the return of those lost in the accident, and before dawn the coffins draped with the Union Flag were taken to the airport in readiness for the flight home. That morning, the West German authorities, prompted by a number of irresponsible comments which ad appeared in the press over the weekend, issued their own statement which was printed in the Times:

“After preliminary investigations the West German Traffic and Transport Ministry finds that the fact that the aircraft did not leave the ground was probably the result of ice on the wings and that the Captain had not given a satisfactory explanation of why he did not discontinue the final attempt to take off”

In spite of the fact that the enquiry was still some months off the Germans had been prepared to show an early hand and to indicate quite clearly the directions of which their suspicions lay. The statement was made against all the evidence. The press release came as a tremendous blow to Captain Thain. On Monday afternoon, the dead were flown back to England. The aircraft stopped briefly in London for 4 coffins to be removed before continuing the flight to Manchester where they lay at the airport overnight. The next morning the flag draped coffins were taken in solemn procession through the streets of Manchester to Old Trafford, with an estimated 100,000 crows standing along the route and outside the ground to pay their respects.

Meanwhile life in Manchester and in Munich continued. United obtained a postponement of their game against Sheffield Wednesday from Sat 15^th Feb to 19^th Feb and wasted no time in an attempt to rebuild a shattered team. In Munich enquiries were continued by the German authorities and the British investigating teams, although along increasingly widening lines. The Germans still insisted on the ice theory, in spite of the British observation that slush and melting snow on a cold runway were hardly in keeping with ice forming at the same times on the wings which before the incident had been heated for anti icing purposes on the descent into Munich. Ice on the wings was, of course, the responsibility of the Captain and contamination of the runway was the Airport Directors responsibility. The conflict of interest was hardly surprising. The problem confronting both teams was that the effects of icing on wings and its inherent danger was a well known phenomenon, whilst virtually nothing was known about the effects of slush drag. The British Airline Pilots Association had records of a number of alarming incidents involving slush covered runways, and was not entirely surprised that a serious accident had finally occurred while attempting take off from a contaminated surface. A request was sent out for additional reports of similar events and a number of frightening tales came to light. The captain of an empty Viscount on a positioning flight from London sent his account of a take off from a Manchester runway covered in thick slush. An inspection of the runway was completed by the Captain before departure but in the absence of any guidelines relating to such conditions he decided to take off.

“As I charged down the runway I noticed fluctuations in the acceleration but was unable to exceed 90k (V1 would have been about 98kt and V2 108kt). About two thirds down the runway the speed decelerated to 85kt and I hauled the nose wheel off the ground. The speed immediately built up and we unstuck. What was particularly noticeable was the marked surge in acceleration, indication the large drag which had been on the main wheels, even with the nose wheel clear of the deck. I gathered together (in fact we all did) our shattered nerves, and flew back to London. I certainly appreciated this behaviour of tricycle undercarriage in slush, but die to my lack of experience on the type, did not realise the dangerous effect drag had on the nose wheel in particular.”

A number of communications, including one notable report released by the Canadian authorities, had circulated around some airline companies cautioning about the possible dangers inherent in slush, but few had been alert to the seriousness of the charge. One company in particular (KLM) had been sufficiently alarmed by reports to issue brief guidelines to its pilots:

“Do not attempt to take off in tricycle aircraft, when slush or wet snow is more than 2in deep on the runway.

The increased resistance due to slush, which varies according to the speed of the aircraft, may reach such a value that it equals the available thrust and prevents further acceleration.

Pitching movement on the nose wheel may also build up so rapidly that it cannot be controlled by the elevators. If the nose wheel is difficult to lift, it is a sign of danger, and the take off should be discontinued immediately. The elevator trim tab should not be used excessively in such circumstances to help the stick force, otherwise a critical control condition may result as the tail heavy aircraft suddenly leaves the ground”

BEA, admittedly in keeping with the knowledge of the times, did not treat slush with the caution we now know it deserves. Operations Manuals contained virtually no instructions for pilots on take off from contaminated runways and judgement was left very much to individual captains. A fact which BALPA, now firmly behind Thain, was at pains to point out to the company.

On Wednesday 19^th February a makeshift Manchester United team, including Ernie Taylor bought from Blackpool and Stan Crowther from Aston Villa, with 5 reserves of which two were under 17, faced Sheffield Wednesday before a 60,000 crowd at Old Trafford. United ended the match winning 3-0 and the atmosphere in the city was electric.

Early the next morning, Feb 20^th just after 0200hrs, Duncan Edwards, probably the greatest footballer since the war, died of his injuries in Munich. He was only 23. The casualty figure now read 22 dead. In the same hospital Captain Rayment, lay in a coma into which he had fallen on the evening of the crash, was still fighting for his life. At home, Captain Thain was also fighting, for his career. Investigations were leaning much too heavily on the iced wing theory as far as the crash was concerned and attempts were being made by Thain and BALPA to gather more information on the effects of slush. It was even suggested that BEA mount a slush trial using one of the redundant Elizabethans which had already been retired from service to make way for Viscounts, but without success.

(This brings to mind – why did BEA charter a plane to United that was already being retired and had known engine surge boost problems? - See attached email at base of page for some more information on this.

As the weeks passed in preparation for the Inquiry and the beginning of Captain Thain’s ordeal, Captain Rayment’s struggle came to an end. He died in Rechts der Isar hospital on 15 March, the last of those involved to lose their life. By the middle of April good progress had been made in the preparation of evidence for the forthcoming inquiry. Much detail had been collected in Britain and West Germany and there was growing confidence amongst all participants that the proceedings would be conducted in a fair and just manner. In the Munich hospital all but Matt Busby had been released, but finally, on April 18^th, he was declared fit enough to travel and allowed home. The marvellous work of the staff at Rechts der Isar hospital in caring for the injured was gratefully recognised by the award of the CBE to the Chief Surgeon, Professor Georg Maurer.

The first ever West German Inquiry into an accident involving a foreign aircraft opened at 1000hrs on the morning of Tuesday 28^th April 1958. Under the direction of Judge Walter Stimpel, a former Luftwaffe pilot. Reichel, the chief investigator, presented the case on behalf of the West German Commission of Inquiry, whose members were experts in various aviation fields. BEA was also well represented by a number of leading personnel, including their chief accident investigator Wg Cmdr Gibbs. Reulations were relaxed to allow Captain Thain to attend and he, and the deceased Rayment were represented by Captains Gilman and Key of BALPA. The sessions were held in private, under guard, in the conference room of a rather stark building at Munich airport. Despite the gravity of the situation the atmosphere was reasonably convivial.

Reichel himself began by reading his own report which covered in detail events leading up to and including the third and final take off attempt. Then turned to the evidence of wheel marks noted on the ground.

Reichel: The wheel tracks from this third attempt were clearly visible at the end of the 1907m runway and beyond it in the slush. This showed that the aircraft did not become airborne at any time. This was confirmed by most of the witnesses statements. Just short of the runway the emergency tail wheel is said to have clearly left a track for quite a distance. I myself did not see this track, since numerous aircraft used the runway during the interval before my arrival. The track was however clearly preserved at the end of the runway and on the 250m stopway beyond it, as far as the fence which encloses the airport grounds. The tracks of the left hand wheel were visible only sporadically as far as the fence. The tracks of the twin wheels on the right hand side of the undercarriage had made a continuous and firm impression. There was no sign of a nose wheel track.”

The emergency tail wheel was so placed to prevent scraping the tail at high nose attitudes and its mark through the slush plainly revealed the extreme nose up angle being demanded at that stage in the vain attempt to become airborne. Reichel’s statement was intended to imply, however, that the excessive nose up attitude detected at the end of the runway suggested Rayment has been pulling back hard on the column for some time in an endeavour to take off; yet something had prevented him doing so. Could the “something” be ice on the wings? Thain had himself testified that the nose up attitude had not been excessive during the take off run so the suggestion did not bear close examination. Reichel continued with the report leading to the discovery of ice on the wings, pointing out that, with the exception of Zulu Uniform, all aircraft had been exposed to the elements for a long time during their stop at Munich that afternoon had been de-iced before departure. This was a bad point against Thain and was not going to be overlooked by Reichel. Although in the marginal conditions of that day the decision had been taken , correctly as it turned out, not to require de-icing, the fact that everyone else did eroded Thain’s standing. The report then turned to condition of the runway, stating that:

“There were varying opinions on the snow conditions on the runway. The quantity of snow which had fallen up to the time of the third attempted take off would be about 4cm. However the snow had fallen on a non frozen and very wet base so that it had subsided to form a layer of slush”

The end of the report contained an account of Reichel’s arrival in Munich, in which it was stated that no problems had been encountered in landing on the same runway and in the same direction. The object of the Inquiry was to establish cause, not to put Captain Thain on trial, yet here he was, right at the start, being pushed very much on the defensive. Thain was called to read his own statement which was heard in silence apart from one or two interruptions from Judge Stimpel to clarify a point. A number of witnesses were now called including Bill Black, Count Rudolph zu Castell, the airport director and the young airport trainees who had observed the departure from the top of the terminal building. Surprisingly, the experienced controllers in the tower were not called to testify, and would not be called independently because Riechel alone selected the witnesses. Written evidence was also presented from a Herr Reinhardt Meyer, the first on the scene of the accident and the witness to the tyre marks through the slush on the runway. Meyer, it was stated, had been unable to attend and was unavailable for cross examination. Under questioning at the time of the crash the airport trainees had stated that some snow, especially near the wing tips, was visible before Zulu Uniform’s departure and they now confirmed their observations. The photograph taken at the time showed areas of the wing obscured, and was displayed to support the evidence. Questioning then centred on the attitude of the aircraft, the slush spray generated, and the wheel marks on the ground. The airport trainees each seemed to think that the aircraft attitude during the take off run was higher than normal yet all contradicted themselves by reporting that they saw slush thrown up in a bow wave fashion from the front! A number of other witnesses had also observed the large slush bow spray which seemed to indicate the nose wheel actually touching the surface during the run rather than being in the air. This was more in keeping with Rayment’s struggle to hold the nose wheel just off the ground against the slush force on the main gear, and the trimming required to ease the strain. Perhaps the nose had dropped inadvertently further down the runway, it was suggested to the trainees? This was difficult to tell was the reply, owning to the amount of spray being thrown up and the distance involved. Count zu Castell now turned to the inspection of the wreckage and the discovery of ice some 6 hours after the accident.

Castell: During our examination – on many parts of the surface – we quite definitely felt and saw a rough course grained layer of ice on the surface of the wing. The nose of the wing was free of ice, the engine nacelle and the area of the wing behind it was also free of ice though covered in snow. I should like to add that there was ice on some parts of the airscrews – the rough layer of ice on the wing would have been 5mm at least, if not thicker.

NO measurement of ice thickness had been taken at any point so how the figure of 5mm had been arrived at was a mystery? (More lies?). So too was the ice on the propeller blade, which would hardly have been evident during take off, and must have formed after the accident. However if ice had formed there since the crash surely the same could have happened with the wings? There was also the mystery of the engine nacelles being free of ice. In the words of Werner Goetz, the airport technical manager, “I was interested above all in the area near the engines because, in our experience, ice tends to form there first, the engine is warm, the snow melts and then ice forms. But I found no ice under the snow which was falling continuously”.

The Inquiry opened the next day with the reading of various statements taken from other airport trainees who each testified that snow, to a greater or lesser degree, had been seen lying on the wings of the aircraft before departure. This led to a discussion of the weather conditions at the time and a Dr Muller from a meteorological office nearby was called to testify. Dr Muller was careful not to commit himself on any subject, but conceded “one cannot completely exclude the possibility that in the 6 hours between the accident and the observation of the layer of ice a certain irregular layer of ice could have formed on certain parts of the wing”. Also discussed was the possibility of the half melted snow on the wings freezing as a result of the wind chilling effect during the take off runs, but this was deemed unlikely. Even if ice could be formed under such circumstances the lack of ice on the engine nacelles, the most probable place for icing to occur, could not be explained.

A Dr Schlichting, professor of steam mechanics at Brunswick University, was then called to consider the aerodynamic implications had the ice discovered after the accident had been present during the final take off attempt. He felt sufficiently confident to state that the roughness of the wing surface caused by that amount of ice could make the take off impossible but was less able to explain in aerodynamic terms the drop in speed experienced. Kurt Bartz, then gave evidence regarding the condition of the runway and details of the drive to inspect the surface carried out on the afternoon of the crash. The time estimated by Bartz to carry out the inspection and the distance travelled did not tally and pointed to a rather inadequate check of the slush, or the use of a very fast vehicle. He was followed by a Mr J Kenward, a BEA engineer and performance expert, who had been involved with the Elizabethan since its introduction into service in 1952. His calculations demonstrated that up to 3 inches of ice on the wings of an Elizabethan would be necessary to create any noticeable disturbance in the aerodynamic properties. Graphs were also displayed to indicate acceleration characteristics on both dry and contaminated runways showing that wing accretion, even to that extent, could not have resulted in any slowing of the aircraft. Slush drag coefficients were introduced in an attempt to explain the deceleration, but since as Kenward pointed out, nobody knew much about it, the slush drag effect might be much greater than anticipated. The confusion in the inquiry room was now certainly more than expected and amid much perplexity the second day ended.

The final day began with discussions about the roles of the pilots on the day of the accident, and led through a number of points to consideration of decision making on the flight deck. Could any inadvertent misunderstanding have occurred between the two Captains, one willing the aircraft to depart, the other to abort? And why was Thain, the commander, sitting in the right hand seat? No laws had been broken or course, although BEA did make a point of indicating that company regulations had been broken. And so, in ever decreasing circles, the third day grew to a close. Judge Stimpel summed up by stating that at that moment the commission was in no position to reach a definite conclusion, the scientists were requested to return to their drawing boards, and the inquiry was adjourned until further notice.

On 25^th June 1958 the inquiry resumed, this time in Frankfurt, in the conference room of the Federal Bureau of Air Safety. Time and further research had not brought the opinions of the scientific antagonists any closer and the original stances were maintained. The same arguments were reiterated except for two notable exceptions outlined by the British team in support of Captain Thain. R Jones, a British meteorologist, pointed out that 4-5cm of snow would have to fall and melt to produce 5mm of ice. Since it was established that only 0.5cm fell in the 1 ¾ hours Zulu Uniform spent on the ground, from where did the remainder materialise? Kenward, the BEA performance expert. Also put forward an interested theory. If slush drag were related to speed, not weight, as Schlicjting contended, then a very different picture emerged! He drew a rough graph of drag against speed showing the effect of retardation of an aircraft if it was considered that increase in drag was related to the square of speed. The result demonstrated, if his figures were correct, that not only could acceleration be markedly reduced in such cases but that deceleration could actually take place; the exact circumstances surrounding Zulu Uniform’s fatal take off.

1. It will not be possible to clear up all the events which contributed to the accident.

2. A rough layer of ice on the wing surface undoubtedly impaired the aerodynamic properties of the aircraft. This layer contributed substantially to the accident.

3. It is not impossible that other circumstances may have contributed, which it is no longer possible to determine in detail.

In the meantime Thain turned his attention to the poultry farm and struggled to maintain his sanity while in the football world Manchester United strived to regain their poise. They were, not surprisingly under the circumstances, knocked out of the European Cup by Milan. But, by a magnificent effort, reached the FA Cup Final where they were defeated by Bolton Wanderers. So ended the 1957/58 season. The summer months went by, the next football season began, Christmas passed and the New Year dawned with still no statement from the Germans. Finally on March 9^th 1959, the long awaited report was released. The layer of ice on the wings had been found to be the “decisive cause” although not the “sole cause” of the accident. The inquiry, and Thain’s career, came to an end. Following publication of the report the BEA Air Safety Committee was quick to follow with its own conclusion:

1. The accident was due to the aircraft failing to achieve the required speed to enable it to become airborne in the conditions prevailing.

2. The German Commission of Inquiry had attributed this to icing on the wings which had been described in their report as the “decisive cause”.

3. The Committee feels unable to accept this evaluation of the importance of icing, but accepts that it was certainly a significant factor. Slush on the unway may have been another important factor, and there may have also been other contributory causes.

4. The Committee feels that it is not possible to evaluate the exact degree of importance attributable to these two factors, either singly or in combination.

5. The Committee notes that at the time of the accident Captain Thain, designated Captain of the aircraft, was not occupying the left hand seat; thereby contravening Flying Staff Instructions.

In due course Thain’s flying licence was suspended by the Ministry in a manner considered controversial, and questions were asked in the House of Commons regarding his treatment. Meanwhile Thain, unwilling to accept the report’s findings, sought further evidence to reopen the inquiry and in the process turned over some very interesting stones. Black, the BEA station engineer at Munich, traced some local engineers who worked for Pan Am. One Otto Steffer, and his son Karl-Heinz, who also worked at the airport as a part time fireman, had helped free Rayment from the wreckage. Black obtained a statement from the younger Steffer declaring that he had walked over the wings inboard of the engines to climb on top of the shattered cockpit and had found no evidence of ice deposit in a place where Reichel had “discovered” ice six hours after the crash. See image below.

Analysis of the runway camber at Munich showed that slush ridges could have trapped water to a depth of as much as 4 – 6 inches at the runway edge, and corroborated pilot’s accounts of large puddles formed at times on the runway. Mrs Thain, a graduate chemist, came up with the answer to the mystery of no ice on the wings behind the engine nacelles; fire extinguisher discharges directed at fires mostly in the region of the nacelles would have covered the wings in the area with an effective anti freeze which would have prevented icing. It was also discovered that due access to all documents had not been achieved and the West German authorities were now approached with a request to supply all material. Inspection of the data revealed, to an amazed Thain, that not only had the air traffic controllers not been invited to the inquiry but vital evidence submitted by them had not been presented to the Commission. In the words of one Controller:

“It began rolling normally and built up speed until it was about halfway down the runway, the nose wheel left the ground, but touched down again after about 60 – 70 metres.”

Here was direct evidence of problems in maintaining the nose up attitude associated with slush, yet, unbelievably the information appeared to have been suppressed. All the new evidence was presented with a request to reopen the inquiry, but to no avail. On 14^th March 1960, the West German authorities announced that “the facts, evidence and other points to which the attention of the Commission was drawn do not justify the reopening of the proceedings”.

The authority of the Ministry of Aviation to revoke Captain Thain’s licence without due investigation on its own part was called to question and on Mon 4^th Apr 1960, a hearing was opened to review whether Thain’s duties as Captain of Zulu Uniform had been properly performed. The hearing was not assembled to assess the cause of the accident, although of course, the event would feature prominently in discussions. After 4 days of deliberation the review concluded that Captain Thain had not conducted his duties properly in assessing whether the wings were clear of ice and snow. It was another tremendous blow to Thain, but more was yet to come. The report was not made public until 12^th October 1960; over 2 ½ years since the accident, during which time Thain had been grounded by BEA pending the outcome of the various sessions. The Ministry conceded that his time away from flying exceeded any period of suspension that might have been imposed and duly offered the return of his licence. The following day Thain received a letter from BEA stating that since company regulations had been broken by his failure to occupy the left seat and to assess properly the conditions of the wings of his aircraft, his employment was now terminated. At this point Thain’s morale could sink no lower, from here the only way was up.

Fresh slush trials were conducted in the USA with new evidence being amassed, but further approaches to the Germans to open the inquiry were simply rebuffed. Manchester United’s court case against BEA alleging negligence was imminent, but suddenly without warning, it was dropped and settled out of court for about 1/10^th of the original sum claimed. At least one of the aerodynamic experts preparing evidence for the case stated “the effect of the deposit on the wings was at the most of marginal significance and then only when conditions were already very critical owing to slush”. The course of events was beginning to turn.

Scientific interest in the effects of slush was also on the increase in Britain, and by the end of 1963 trials of a number of aircraft, including the Elizabethan, were begun at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough. The results were not published until Apr 1964, but clearly showed that all suspicions regarding the effects of slush had been confirmed. The theory proposed by Kenward, the BEA performance expert, that slush drag was related to the square of the speed was proved accurate and the tests demonstrated quite clearly that a depth of as little as 0.5cm of slush the Elizabethan required 50% more runway for take off than when dry. Now with the backing of the Ministry of Aviation, the Germans were asked to consider the latest evidence and invited to reopen the inquiry. A further 18 months passed before the sessions opened on 18 November 1965, to re-examine the case.

Thain now faced the Inquiry convinced that justice was about to be done. But his hopes were not to survive for long. The Germans were adamant that no new witnesses would be called, although, of course, they were prepared to listen to the additional evidence regarding slush. After two days of discussion the inquiry drew to a close with the result a foregone conclusion. A draft of the report sent to Great Britain clearly indicated that, “Icing was still to be regarded as an essential cause of the accident, slush however, must be regarded as an further cause. The command structure on board G-ALZU was not entirely clear cut and may also have had an unfavourable effect.”

There were so many errors and inconsistencies in the documents that the British baulked at the distorted facts and implored the Germans to revise their findings, but they would not. By April 1966, the Ministry of Aviation, tired of the Germans, issued, to its credit, its own deduction.

“We conclude that there is a strong likelihood that there was no significant icing during the take off – we conclude that the principal cause of the crash was the effect of slush on the runway”.

In spite of the Ministry view, the Germans were not to be swayed (After all they were covering up their own lies and deceit!). However, thanks to a timely comment from the Prime Minister, Harold McMillan, by coincidence on a visit to Manchester United at Old Trafford, a new British hearing was finally ordered. The sessions opened in London on Monday 10^th July 1968, more than 10 years after the crash and two months after Manchester United had finally realised their dream by winning the European Cup at Wembley against the pride of Portugal, Benfica. All previous evidence was to be reviewed and all available witnesses interviewed or their written statements considered. It was to be a most thorough and full investigation.

The key witness was to be Herr Meyer, the first on the scene of the crash and the observer of the marks on the runway. He had been unable to appear at the original hearing, or so it was assumed, and had not yet testified personally. Meyer was them living in the USA but at that time was on holiday with his family in Bremen, and members of the commission travelled there for the interview. Not only was Meyer an aeronautical engineer but also a trained pilot, and his comments could be received with the widest respect. What he had to say came as a surprise to all concerned. He had examined the wings shortly after the crash and had noted that there was “nothing like frost or frozen deposit; that I know definitely – there was melted snow ONLY”. He continued that he had told Reichel but had heard no more of it. Any why hadn’t he presented this information to the inquiry? “I was not called to give evidence and I didn’t even see them”, was Meyer’s reply. He had been DELIBERATELY omitted, along with a number of other key witnesses, from the German Inquiry. (As I stated earlier – a Cover up!). It was incredible! It was also revealed that there had been TAMPERING of Meyer’s original written statement and that his comment on the ABSENCE of ice on the wings had been deleted. A summary of the presentation of evidence in the German Commission of Inquiry declared that “Meyer’s evidence was truncated and the most significant part of his evidence was concealed”.

The mystery of the photograph allegedly showing areas of the wing surface obscured by particles of snow was also solved. The original print had been from a copy negative, but now a fresh print from the original negative had been acquired and clearly showed the lettering and markings on the wings. Photographic experts were called to examine this new evidence and unanimously agreed that, in their opinion, there was no sign of ice or snow on the wings. This is the actual photo below. It was scanned in from a photcopy. I hope to be able to scan in the original soon.

The report of the proceedings were made public on 10^th June 1969, and made interesting reading:

“ We are satisfied that at, or after, reaching V1 the aircraft’s nose wheel re-entered the slush… had this not happened, the aircraft must have flown off… We are equally satisfied that the descent of the nose wheel was caused by increased drag exerted through the main wheels, in other words, by the aircraft entering a trail of deeper and/or denser slush…. This increase in drag … is in our view the prime cause of the accident. We are satisfied that thereafter the aircraft ran with six wheels in the slush until towards the end of the runway it rotated to the point where the tail wheel made contact with the ground …. We can be sure that the period between V1 and rotation was one of deceleration … we cannot reach certainty as to the speed at the end of the period … Once the aircraft was rotated without lifting off, the accident was inevitable. There was not enough runway left to regain sufficient speed … our considered view is that the cause of the accident was slush on the runway. Whether wing icing was also a cause, we cannot say. It is possible, but unlikely. In accordance with our terms of reference we therefore report that in our opinion blame for the accident is NOT to be imputed to Captain Thain.”

To this day, the Germans still refuse to acknowledge the findings of the British Commission. (Hardly surprising!!).

As the dust settled, Captain Thain carried on running his poultry farm, as well as farming some 30 odd acres of land in Berkshire. He disbanded the poultry business in 1969 and continued farming until the strains of his earlier struggles took their toll and he died of a heart attack at only 54 years of age, in 1975. (Killed, as where the passengers, by the negligence of the airport authorities in Munich).

From the evidence as presented above there is no doubt in my mind that a cover up was engineered by the West German authorities, possibly even as high as the Federal Government in Bonn. There was never going to be any doubt about the outcome. From the first inspection of the crash site to the publication of the report. Questions raised by myself after reading and typing out this pages are:

1. Why was the crash site not cordoned off and nobody but official investigators allowed on site? As stated above, anybody who wished could, and did, walk the site, picking over the wreckage.

2. When the crash site inspection team finally arrived on the site 6 hours later, did they only make cursory inspections and not a thorough one? As soon as Reichel saw the ice on the wings, even after 6 hours of lying in the field, why did he automatically assume the problem solved and look no further. They also arrived on the scene long after the throng of rescue workers had done their task and the newspaper people and airport workers had clambered over the wreckage with no restraint. By this time vital evidence had been destroyed under trampling feet. The Politzei made no attempt to keep the wreckage clear of people.

3. Why was vital evidence deliberately withheld, again by Reichel, from the Commission of Inquiry? And documents deliberately, fraudulently, amended?

4. Why did the German authorities publically publish their claims in The Times to the fact that "ice on the wings" was the cause; weeks before the Inquiry even convened in Munich?

5. Why did BEA charter out to the Manchester party an aircraft that was already being mothballed out of service and already being replaced by the new Viscount aircraft? Steve Rayment tells me this would not have been anything unusual, I accept that.

6. Why did Reichel deliberately lie to Thain in his interview with Captain Thain in front of witnesses about when he examined the aircraft?

7. In spite of overwhelming world wide evidence, via US and British tests, and pilots testimonies, why do the German still stick to their biased, lie ridden refusal to bend to the inevitable truth?

8. What were the German authorities so afraid of that they had to hide, manipulate and sabotage evidence to suit their own ends?

9. Why were vital eye witnesses kept away from the Inquiry and, in some cases, not even interviewed formally after the initial interview by Reichel?

10. It took until 1968 to get a thorough investigation going and that was conducted by the British? The Germans hid behind walls of silence and NEIN!

Although it was technically the fault of the Airport Director in not ensuring that his runway was kept clear of snow or slush; the general world wide feeling at the time was not drawn to the dangers of slush as a retarding factor. Instead the German's had already decided that it would be "pilot error" and in no way did they even consider that slush on the runway, THEIR runway, was going to be a contributing factor. The Munich runway had a known camber which "collected" rain (or slush) in pools inches deep. This slush was becoming a known hazard before the crash as KLM (Dutch Airlines) had already published guidelines to all their pilots about the danger of tricycle undercarriaged aircraft and slush on runways as had the Canadians also. Captains Thain and Rayment were possibly the two best pilots in the BEA fleet and to shed blame in their direction was a whitewash by both the German authorities and BEA for not standing by their pilots after the report had been published. The Ministry also shedded its responsibility by revoking Captain Thain's flying licence prematurely. These factors contributed to Captain Thain's death in my opinion, a broken man.

March 26th 2005: Received an email from Mark Wiles regarding the reason that the particular plane was used. Here it is:

I would just point out that the reports that BEA's Elizabethan was about to be "mothballed" in favour of newer Viscounts, seem to suggest it was an old or outmoded aircraft. This isn't strictly as it seems - the aircraft was at the time only six years old having been delivered in 1952, and was being delivered roughly at the same time as the Viscounts, so the aircraft wasn't old fashioned or out of date. It was just the case that passengers were demanding Viscounts because they were faster and quieter, and BEA was losing custom with the Elizabethan despite them being new, and in many ways more advanced than many American aircraft of the time. Also, only 20 were ever made, compared to over 600 Viscounts, so it made economic sense for BEA to withdraw the aircraft of which they were the only operator. They were soon snapped up by smaller airlines and the last one flew about 1969-70, so they were very much only just getting into their stride when withdrawn. I would also expect BEA sent out an Elizabethan because they were smaller than the Viscount (seating 44-48 compared to a Viscount which sat 50-70 depending on type) and more suited to the number to be carried, and possibly because they were available whereas the Viscounts would have been in demand for passenger service. Obviously the main story is of course the tragic loss of the young football team and not the history of BEA's post war airliners, but I thought it might help explain the apparent mystery of why BEA were sending out a soon to be withdrawn type for a prestige charter - their impending withdrawal wasn't to do with the age or condition of the plane, it was the demand for the faster turboprop that led to the premature withdrawal of the type. Mark Wiles.

May 11th 2005: I received this from Captain John Murray. Thank you for providing such an authoritative and deeply researched not least most interesting account and publishing it on the web concerning the the Manchester United air crash tragedy. I came across it quite by chance last night whilst doing some research on BEA Airspeed Ambassadors. My interest in this is quite personal. I live close to United's ground and as a member go there regularly. I knew Harry Gregg some years ago when he lived just along my Road as a fellow Ulsterman and we once talked about the crash. When I was a child I often flew between Belfast and Brussels via London on BEA Elizabethans which included the subject aircraft. Subsequently, as an Airline Captain, I myself flew the Manchester United team to a European game in the 1980's and also had Sir Matt Busby as a passenger on a number of occasions when he was travelling on holiday before he passed away. I have also obviously flown many times between Munich and Manchester and a number of times during my career benefited from the lessons learnt on contaminated runways in relation to aircraft take-off performance. It is very rare to find an account so accurately rendered from an aviators point of view.

March 3rd 2006: Email From Steve Rayment: I was invited to visit the New Stand when it opened, of course l visited the Munich Room, and it was very emotional, there was the Father l had hardly got to know l was 9 when he died, l managed to get 2 tickets to the 1968 European Cup final at Wembley, great night. My Father was a WW2 Fighter ACE, he shot down 5 Germans and 1 Italian while flying a Beaufighter, then got 1 V1 rocket while flying a Mosquito, he left the RAF in 45, flew for BOAC in Cairo for 1 year before joining BEA, where he flew Vikings, Dakota's and the Elizabethan. As far as the Germans were concerned, it was their first accident investigation after WW2, and they were clearly only interested in making sure the airport was not at fault, BEA new about Slush effect and never told their Pilots, they stopped certain Pilots from testifying at the hearings to help Thain, they wanted him out due to his Union connections. When l arrived at my present home, my next door neighbour was the Station Engineer for Lufthansa, he watched the whole accident from the rooftop of the terminal with 6 cadets, he saw the lettering on the top of the wings, and was one of the first people on the accident site, and said there was no ice at all, anyway sadly the team and my dad paid a big price. Steve Rayment. Pilot. Son of Capt Rayment - co pilot.