Buy My WW2 Book here
(Kite has her own chapter)

 

 

By Mike Kemble (c) From information provided by Ray Holden, Clem Bray, Christine Chaplin, Lionel Irish, Mary Davies, Paul Masterson & Others

Created 24 November 2001

Report of the Board of Enquiry into
The Sinking of HMS Kite On 21st August 1944

Part 1: Boards of Enquiry - Instructions
Part 2: Convening Order - Loss of HMS Kite
Part 3: Secret Signals from HMS Keppel
Part 4: The Board of Enquiry Transcript (& following pages)
Part 5: Keppel Report, Findings, Letter from Dir of Torp & Minings
Part 6: Emails and my own Findings

   
HMS Kite and HMS Keppel

Nothing has been changed in the following letters, signals or transcripts except the format, it was far too large for a web document - no words have been changed. Any comments or queries added by myself are in red. I am indebted to Christine Chaplin who dispatched these documents to Ray Holden who forwarded them on to me for inclusion in the unfolding saga of HMS Kite.  What unfolds on these documents does not make a pretty picture and gives the appearance of a bit of a "whitewash" of Naval Officers, form your own opinions!! Following on from the Board of Enquiry transcript I will give the official report and my own opinions on this, although admittedly, I am no sailor! Mike Kemble.

Part 1

Letter from Admiral Sir Max Horton regarding Instructions that Boards of Enquiry were to follow.

OFFICE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF

WESTERN APPROACHES
DERBY HOUSE
LIVERPOOL
25th AUGUST 1944

BOARDS OF ENQUIRY

In amplification of the instructions given in paragraph 1 of Form S 1360, I wish to bring to the attention of officers concerned my views on the conduct of Boards of Enquiry.

2.    The task of a Board of Enquiry is usually to investigate some occurrence which has been brought about by a failure of personnel, material or organization. The main object of the investigation is to obtain such information as will enable us to guard against a repetition of the same, or similar occurrence. This means that we must find out who, if anyone, was responsible for the failure and whether the fault lies inside or outside the ship itself; it may be with some authority or department, or civilian firm, or some individual in the ship.

3.    Unless specifically so ordered it is not the duty of a Board of Enquiry to propose disciplinary action but, for the reasons given above, it is essential that their Finding should specify in detail what persons in the ship (under the general responsibility of the Commanding Officer) were responsible for what happened and the precise degree in which each acted incorrectly or failed to act. This is a matter which is frequently glossed over or not clearly pressed to a definite conclusion; it is, however, important that he who has failed should be left in no doubt how and where he went wrong, so that he may profit by the experience and act correctly on a future occasion. If on the other hand the Board reach the conclusion that no person in the ship was in any way responsible for the occurrence they must clearly state this opinion in their Findings.

4.    The Admiralty have directed that members of Boards of Enquiry investigating accidents, losses of stores etc, before coming to any conclusion which imputes blame to any person, should consider carefully:

    (i)    whether his apparent fault was due to negligence or inexperience or both

    (ii)    whether, having regard to his previous experience in similar operations, it was reasonable to entrust him with that particular duty.

    The Board's opinion on these points should be included in their Findings.

5.    It is also an important part of the duty of every Board of Enquiry to make recommendations for the future prevention of similar occurrences.

6.    Every officer who convenes a Board of Enquiry in the Western Approaches Command is to furnish the President with a copy of this memorandum, which is to be attached to Form S.136Q and included in the minutes.

7.    The special attention of Administrative Authorities, who have the subsequent handling of the reports of Boards of Enquiry, is called to my memorandum No W.A.190P of 15th June 1943, which was addressed to Flag Officers in Charge and Captains (D).

 

MAX HORTON
Admiral
Commander in Chief

Distribution:

    Flag and Naval Officers in Charge
    R.A.C.O.B. (W.A)
    Commodore (D) Western Approaches
    Captains (D) Belfast, Liverpool, Greenock
    Commanding Officer, HMS IRWELL

Part 2

The Convening Order for the Board of Enquiry into the sinking of HMS Kite:

SECRET

Office of Flag Officer in Charge
GREENOCK

8th September 1944

S.1360 MEMORANDUM

You are to assemble on board at Navy House, Clarence St, Greenock, at 1000 on Sunday 9th September, as a board of whereof

Commander A H Thorold, OBE,DSO,RN of HMS Cygnet is to be the president and hold a full and careful investigation into the circumstances attending:

THE LOSS OF HMS KITE

2.    The enquiry is to be conducted in accordance with the directions contained in Kings Regulations and Admiralty Instructions Chapter XI. and Commander in Chief, Western Approaches Memorandum No WA4190P of 25th August 1944 (copy for the President only).

3.    The report of the Board is to be accompanied by the minutes of evidence taken, and is to contain an expression of opinion on the merits of the case as disclosed by the evidence, including a statement of the causes of the occurrence.

4.    The questions in the minutes are to be numbered consecutively, and the name and rank or rating of each witness are to appear at the head of each page on his evidence.

5.    The reports and minutes are each to be signed by the members of the Board and are to be in triplicate.

6.    The original report is to be sent herewith for the purpose of the enquiry, and is to be returned with the report of the Board, together with this memorandum.

7.    The Commanding Officer, HMS ORLANDO has been informed and directed to afford the Board all the necessary facilities.

8.    Unless the president has something to communicate he is to send the reports when completed, not to bring them.

9.    A shorthand writer has been detailed from the Office of the Flag Officer in Charge, Greenock.

 

To:     COMMANDER A H THOROLD, OBE, DSO, RN  HMS CYGNET                                      Signature

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER F L COX, RNVR HMS ORLANDO                                              Rank:  REAR ADMIRAL

LIEUTENANT T W LANCASTER, DSC, RN HMS CYGNET

(Copies to: Commanding Officer, HMS Orlando, Captain (D), Greenock

SECRET

Part 3

Copies of Relevant Signals originating from HMS Keppel/Kite

(Note: SO Escorts was the title being used by CS10). (TOR - Time of Report)

1.    To KEPPEL and KITE                                                                                                         From: SO ESCORTS

                                    Take starboard quarter action in diagram number 2

                                                                                                                                                    20.2230B

___________________________________________________________________________________________

2.    To: SO ESCORTS                                                                                                                From: KEPPEL

                                    Am investigating contact on starboard side

                                                                                                                                                    TOR: 2340

                                    Am attacking with depth charges

                                                                                                                                                    TOR: 2341

                                    My estimated position        135 ZZ 7

________________________________________________________________________________________

3.    To: SO ESCORTS                                                                                                               From: KITE

                                    Am about to attack with depth charges

                                                                                                                                                   TOR: 2353

________________________________________________________________________________________

4.    To: SO ESCORTS                                                                                                              From:  KEPPEL

                                    I am resuming my station. KITE in company

                                    188 ZZ 15                                                                                              TOR: 0121B

________________________________________________________________________________________

5.    To: SO ESCORTS                                                                                                              From: KEPPEL

                                    KITE torpedoed

                                                                                                                                                   TOR: 0642

________________________________________________________________________________________

6.  To: SO ESCORTS                                                                                                                 From: KEPPEL

                                    My estimated position is 194 ZZ 12 miles

                                                                                                                                                   TOR: 0644

______________________________________________________________________________________

7.    To: SO ESCORTS                                                                                                               From: KEPPEL

                                    KITE has been sunk

                                                                                                                                                    TOR: 0655        

______________________________________________________________________________________    

Part 4

The Board of Enquiry Transcript
(Covering Questions 1 - 35)

List of Witnesses

Questions            1              to            35            Petty Officer JRL Payne D/JX 154993
Questions            36            to            53            Leading Seaman EC Bradley D/JX 136903
Questions            54            to            71            Leading Seaman D Brannigan D/SSX 23262
Questions            72            to            83            Able Seaman C Bonsall D/JX 419597
Questions            84            to            91            Able Seaman AP Sharples D/JX 563041
Questions            92            to            101          Able Seaman GH Johnson D/JX 368812
Questions            102          to            117          Able Seaman L Irish D/JX 351286
Questions            118          to            158          Able Seaman R Holmes D/JX 369266
Questions            159          to            182          Able Seaman F Webb D/JX 418056
Questions            183          to            201          Lieutenant John Arthur Douglas RN HMS Keppel
Questions            202          to            210          Sub Lieutenant Raymond William Hall RNVR HMS Keppel
Questions            211          to            213          Petty Officer JRL Payne D/JX 154993 (recalled)

 PETTY OFFICER JOHN RICHARD LEWIS PAYNE Off No: D/JX 154993

Witness called and cautioned

 

Q1       Are you Petty Officer John Richard Lewis Payne Off No: D/JX 154993?

A1       Yes Sir

Q2       Were you serving in HMS KITE on the 21st August 1944?

A2       Yes Sir

Q3       Would you tell the Board what you know of what occurred in HMS Kite at the time of the explosion, or the first you know about it?

A3       I had the morning watch Sir, when it happened. We were getting the PNM's in. The speed was too fast to get the PNM's in and the Petty Officer who was on deck with me went on to the bridge and asked the Officer of the Watch if  he could reduce speed. He said he would reduce speed to 6 knots. I went up on the port side of the boat deck and he stopped heaving in on the floats and we were trying to get the turns out of the wire. Then the explosion happened.

Q4       What was the actual state of the foxers at the time?

A4       The port PNM wire was wrapped round the displacer towing wire and the starboard PNM was in the rattling position.

Q5       What type of floats were you using?

A5       The old displacers Sir

Q6       What was your actual duty as regards getting in the foxers, were you for'd or aft?

A6       Well I had no actual duties at all Sir, because I was in action on the pom pom deck and the other Petty Officer asked me to give him a hand. I went down on the other side of the boat deck. The other Petty Officer was on the quarter deck and was Petty Officer of the Watch.

Q7       Where were you at the actual time of the explosion?

A7       I was on the pom pom deck at the actual time of the explosion Sir.

Q8       What was the original speed before the bridge was asked to reduce?

A8       I am sorry Sir, I don't know what actual speed we were doing. The other Petty Officer came down and told me that they were going to reduce to 6 knots.

Q9       As far as you know, had speed already been reduced when the explosion occurred?

A9       Yes we had already dropped speed.

Q10     Now I think you had better go on with what happened from the explosion onwards.

A10     There was an explosion on the starboard side aft and I was knocked over, and while I was getting up there was a second
explosion. The ship started to heel over very fast; I climbed off the pom pom deck and ran along the port side and the ship was
right over then Sir. I took off my sea boots and coat and ran down the ships side and jumped into the water.

Q11     How far off do you think the explosion was?

A11     One was aft of the companion ladder Sir, on the quarter deck. That is were all the dirt and so forth came from Sir anyway, when I looked.

Q12     At that time had there been only one explosion?

A12     Yes Sir and about three or four seconds later another one. They seemed to blend into one, but there were definitely two
explosions.

Q13     Where do you estimate the second explosion occurred?

A13     On the starboard quarter Sir.

Q14     Was there any difference between the violence of either explosion?

A14     No Sir, they were both the same and very quick together. That is only my estimation though Sir, I am not sure.

Q15     As far as you can see, did one appear to be further for'd or further aft than the other?

A15     The first was further for'd and the second further aft Sir.

Q16     What happened after you got into the water?

A16     When I jumped into the water I was gasping for breath. The water was very cold and I got hold of a life buoy in the water. I could see the stern disappearing. I was on the life buoy Sir, I don't know for how long. There were 4 of us on it, and then I saw a Carley float and swam to that Sir.

Q17     Had you got a life belt on?

A17     Yes but it was not blown up.

Q18     Were you wearing a piece of rope tied round you?

A18     No Sir

Q19     Were there, to your knowledge, any particular orders in the ship about the wearing of lifebelts and lengths of rope
whilst at sea?

A19     We always had to wear a lifebelt Sir, but there were no particular orders about wearing a rope.

Q20     Do you know if many of the ships company did wear pieces of rope?

A21     I was Captain of the Quarter Deck Sir in one or two in my division did, but not very many.

Q22     Did you at any time sight anything resembling a U Boat?

A22     No Sir

Q23     Did many people float clear of the ship?

A23     I jumped over the port side Sir and there were only about a dozen in my estimation who followed me over the port side.
A lot of people seemed to go over the starboard side though Sir.

Q24     Were any orders given as regards abandoning ship?

A24     No I didn't hear any orders given Sir.

Q25     Can you say at all how long you think the ship floated for?

A25     She seemed to go very quickly to me Sir, in less than a minute after we got hit I should think. She heeled right over and went down in less than a minute it seemed to me

Q26     Do you know anything of the state of the watertight doors at the time?

A26     Well they were very strict about them Sir. They should have all been closed below decks Sir.

Q27     After you got onto the raft, how many were there with you on the raft?

A27     There was only one on when I got on, and then after a while 3 more came on Sir.

Q28     Did they all remain on the raft until you were picked up?

A28     Yes Sir.

Q29     How were you actually picked up by HMS Keppel?

A29     She steamed right up to us Sir. They were going to lower the whaler but the sea fetched us right up to the ships side Sir.

Q30     Did they hoist you out?

A30     Yes but I don't remember much about that Sir.

Q31     Did you hear any explosion at all after you were in the water?

A31     Yes Sir, I heard I think it was two, and I asked the chap who was on the Carley Float with me what he thought it was and he said he thought it would be the depth charges going off.

Q32     Were any of the depth charges set to any depth to your knowledge?

A32     To my knowledge, No Sir, they were all set to "safe".

Q33     Was primer placing gear fitted?

A33     Yes Sir.

A34     No Sir, the bows were just disappearing. When I heard these explosions I could see the stern sticking up, about 200 yards Sir and she was going down at the bows.

Q35     From that you mean the ship had split into two bits?

A35     Yes Sir

Examination of witness terminated

Witness withdrew

 

 

 

 

 


Walker RN - Click Here

Copyright ©  Mike Kemble

 


 

 

 

Copyright © mike kemble  Home | Walker RN | U boats  | Merseyside | U534 | U344 |