|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
By Mike Kemble (c) From information provided by Ray Holden, Clem Bray, Christine Chaplin, Lionel Irish, Mary Davies, Paul Masterson & Others Created 24 November 2001
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Report
of the Board of Enquiry into Part 5 REPORT ON THE TORPEDOING OF HMS KITE - HMS KEPPEL 11th September 1944. At 0640N on 21st August 1944 HMS kite was hit on the starboard side by two torpedoes. Survivors state that the ship heeled over to starboard at once and that the stern was cut off and floated clear for a few seconds before sinking. The bow floated for about a minute then sank at a steep angle. "Kite" was proceeding at about 6 knots, course 050 degrees at the time of the explosion. She was clearing her foxers displacers, which had become twisted round one another. Two survivors state that they sighted a conning tower off the starboard bow at close range soon after the explosions. This was not seen from Keppel's bridge, but one lookout reported an object in the water near Kite. It is thought that the U Boat may have surfaced for a few seconds on firing and dived again at once. Keppel closed the wreck at once and then carried out a search, but no contact was obtained. At 0736, with Mermaid and Peacock carrying out observant, Keppel stopped to pick up survivors. The oil in the water was particularly thick and difficulty was experienced in getting survivors inboard quickly. Grapnels were most useful for hoisting men inboard, but several men had little clothing on and some were without life belts. Men wearing jacket type capok life belts and cork life belts were easier to deal with. In all cases the men in the water were unable to help themselves at all. Extra moveable scrambling nets would have enabled more to be saved. There were about 30 men in the water when rescue work started but this number diminished rapidly, due to the thick oil, and it is believed, to lack of life belts. 14 men were rescued, of which 5 died within a few minutes. The following ratings are survivors:
Position: (D/R) 73 01 N 03 57 E Wind: W by N Force 3 Sea and Swell: 22 A/S Conditions: Fair James Tyson - Commander RNR
Western Approaches 22nd September
1944
For ADMIRAL Noted. 2. The fact that no Asdic contact was obtained either by KITE or KEPPEL was probably due to the poor conditions prevalent in Northern waters, and if the attack was from short range there might never have been time to detect the torpedoes approaching. 3. Para 2 of C in C. W.A.'s remarks are concurred in BSP/KS for DIRECTOR OF ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE DIVISION 14th October 1944 Noted, concurring with Captain (D) Greenock's remarks, given in paragraph 2 of FOIC Greenock's covering letter. 2. DTM concurs generally, with paragraph 17 (6) of the Board of Enquiry's findings. All depth charge pistols at present in use by surface ships, even when set to safe, are liable to fire at depths greater than 2000 feet on account of leakage or through fracturing of the safety rod, and, if the primer is home in the detonator, the depth charge will detonate. In the KITE primer placer gear was fitted and in the case of those depth charges which, by force of the torpedo explosion, became separated from their throwers, the primer placer gear would have operated. In addition DTM considers it probable that KITE was using Mark IX or Mark IX pistols. The safety rods of these pistols have been deliberately weakened so that they fracture at a depth of approximately 875 feet in order to give these pistols an extra deep setting, and it was taken into account when producing this modification that the explosion of a depth charge at this depth would not hurt men in the water.
DIRECTOR OF TORPEDOES AND MINING November 1944 Part 6 - The Findings Sir,
2. At 2230 on the 20th August, 1944, H.M.S. KEPPEL and H.M.S. KITE were ordered by Vice
Admiral Commanding 10th Cruiser Squadron in H.M.S. VINDEX to take station
in the
Starboard Quarter Sector
in diagram No.2. Between 2340 20th August and
0121 21st
August they investigated a depth
charged suspicious contact, but there was no result. H.M.S. KITE was
stationed
5,000 yards on the starboard
bow of
H.M.S. KEPPEL.
3.
Displacers were streamed in both ships; in the case of H.M.S. KITE “A’ type were
in
use. H.M.S.
KEPPEL had PNM’s
tripped whilst those
in H.M.S. KITE were in the rattling position.
4. About 0500/21st August H.M.S. KEPPEL requested
H.M.S. KITE to trip PNM’s which were causing interference
with the Asdics.
5.
At some time about 0600 H.M.S. KITE reduced to 6 knots to clear port PNM
unit, the towing wire
of which was wound round the displacer towing wire. During
this time starboard PNM unit was still in the rattling position.
6.
From H.F.D.F. bearings, U-boats were known to be in the vicinity, but
were not thought to
be in the immediate vicinity. H.M.S. KITE had one cruising watch closed
up.
7.
Wind was West by North, Force 3; weather, overcast;
visibility, 7’ sea and swell, 22; course and speed, 050, 6
knots; Asdic
conditions fair to
poor. Temp Air 39 F, Sea 45 F.
8. About 0640 in position 73
01’ N 03 57’ E, H.M.S. KITE was struck on the starboard side
by two torpedoes; there was an interval of a few seconds between each one hitting. The first struck
in
the region of
the break of the
boat deck, and the second further
aft in the vicinity of
the depth charge throwers. The ship broke in two, and the fore part listed heavily to starboard whilst the stern
floated away.
9. From
the evidence
of Able Seaman Reginald Holmes,
no Asdic warning of any sort was received on the Bridge prior to the explosions.
10. The
actual time the ship floated cannot be accurately assessed, but it was undoubtedly
only for
a very short period, probably not much in excess of one to two minutes.
One result of
these explosions was that depth
charges and throwers were hurled into the water, amongst other debris.
11. No orders were
given to abandon ship, but those Officers and ratings who could get
up on deck took to the water almost at once. A Petty Officer and some
ratings did actually attempt
to lower the port whaler, but this quickly proved impracticable. However, a certain amount
of
life-saving equipment,
such as a Carley raft, Flotanets,
timber and a life buoy floated off onto the water.
12.
Shortly after abandoning ship there were four to five under-water
explosions, of no great violence.
13. Leading Seaman Bradley and Able Seaman Johnson both state that after
taking to the water they saw a
I4. From all the
available evidence, it seems that about 70 to 80 of the Ship’s Company got out
of the ship and into the water. After the explosion the following Officers were
seen :
(a) The
Captain, Lieutenant Commander A. N.G. Campbell, R. N
He appeared on the Bridge for a short period but was not afterwards seen
in the water.
(b) The
First Lieutenant, Lieutenant J. A. JONES, R.N. who was seen to get into the
water.
(c) Sub.
Lieutenant J. C. Struthers, R.N.V.R., who
was seen in the water,
(d) Lieutenant
J. F. Savage, R.N.R., who was picked up and subsequently died onboard H.M.S. KEPPLE.
15. H.M.S. KEPPLE, on
observing the explosions, closed H.M.S. KITE’s position and carried out an A/S
search, which, however, proved fruitless.
16. At 0736 H.M.S.
KEPPEL stopped to pick up survivors whilst H.M.S. MERMAID and H.M.S. PEACOCK
carried out operation observant round her. Considerable difficulty was
experienced in getting survivors out of the water owing to the large quantity of
oil about and the fact that few were wearing life belts, and none had lengths of
rope secured round them. When the rescue work commenced there were about
30 men in the water, but these rapidly diminished, and only 14 were picked up,
of whom 5 died within a few minutes.
17. We find that :-
(1) H.M.S. KITE was sunk by two torpedoes fired from a U-boat on the
starboard side
at short range. (2) There is no evidence to show that the magazine exploded.
(3) Although the second
torpedo hit in the vicinity of the Starboard propeller, it is not considered
that either torpedo was a Gnat, as the ship’ s speed of 6 knots was below the
critical speed.
(4) Despite the
poor Asdic conditions it
is nevertheless
considered that
some warning should have been obtained from the Asdic Set.
(5) The loss of H.M.S. KITE must, in some measure, be attributed to the
unsatisfactory performance of the Foxer gear, which necessitated the ship
steaming on a steady course at 6 knots. It is, at the same time, noted that the old type
displacers were in use.
(6)
The explosions heard and
felt by survivors in the water subsequent to the ship breaking in two, are
considered to have been caused by depth charges separated from the throwers by the force of the second torpedo explosion. These
charges were set to safe, but due to being separated from the throwers the
primer ‘placer ‘gear would have come into action and, in fact, the charges exploded
at a considerable depth.
(7) No alarm was passed
or orders given to abandon ship, but we do not consider that there was, in fact,
time to do so.
(8) The
large loss of life must be attributed to the amount of oil fuel about, the low
temperature of the water, and the fact that few of the Ship’s Company were
wearing lifebelts. The orders regarding the wearing of lifebelts on deck seem to
have been rigidly enforced, but the necessity for wearing them when below does
not appear to have been fully brought home to the Ship’s Company. Further,
very few were wearing ropes ends secured round them.
RECOMMENDATIONS
-
(a.) That once again attention be drawn to the necessity of wearing
lifebelts and ropes ends secured round the body at all times. This also
applies to the wearing of identity discs, which were not being worn by all
survivors.
(b) That additional spare Foxer Gear
be allowed to ships, so that when operating in positions where the risk is above
normal and the escorts are likely to be the main target, they can cut away their
Foxers, when they run foul, in preference to reducing to a low speed for
considerable periods in order to disentangle them. As an example, this would apply to ships, stationed in the quarter positions when submerged attack is the main threat and escorts will be the principal target for U-boats which have failed to get in a shot at the convoy.
It
is considered that one additional spare set above the present allowance would be
a reasonable increase. Signed by the officers of the Board.
My initial impression from typing out these reams of reports is that the Board was hell bent on crucifying the ratings for not donning the proper gear and it has whitewashed over the obvious incompetence of Kite's temporary commander, who was actually a submariner!! The "apparent" cowardice of Lieutenant Savage who leapt off the bridge at the first explosion, no orders or directions being given by those in charge, literally leaving "every man for himself". What did the Captain do after swearing at the Germans? The holder of a DSC! Go back to his bunk and hide? Only hours before, Keppel and Kite had detected a U Boat, gave chase, and launched depth charges - so why does the Board's witnesses from the Keppel say, "not in a radius of 30 miles did we expect any U Boats" (Q192). Did these Officers really expect to have chased off (what was probably U344) as easily as that! Why scale down to cruising watch on CONVOY ESCORT in a minefield of U Boats and possible contacts that could have found them? This is the Arctic, U Boat infested, wartime waters we are talking about here, not a lake in some suburban park! The region was notorious for U Boat and aircraft interceptions! I certainly would not go to "cruise watch" there, especially not after having been "in contact". I also feel that Keppel was somewhat economical about the truth in one or two aspects. I am not a sailor, but having spent 17 years in the Army, I do feel that I know the "officer mentality" - not generally a pretty sight; but my reaction to all this is that nobody seemed to either know what they were doing nor, in the cases of some, actually cared. 217 men here lost their lives, many thousands more have lost their lives in convoys across the Atlantic and in the northern seas en route to Russia - but to lose your life to gross incompetence is actually murder, gross stupidity and should not have been overlooked by the Navy. Mike Kemble. October 12th 2004: Received a very good email from the following gent who provides an alternative opinion: Conclusions From Graeme Smith MRIN: I don't think anyone covered up. I HAVE got considerable seagoing experience in a training background where we "set up" emergencies and believe me - people do the strangest things under stress. The captain swearing at Germans and leaving the bridge. People DO that sort of thing when they are unexpectedly caught out. Captain "D" s were not 10 a penny but there were plenty during the war that had NOT been weeded out by the system. Looks like this one was not that good. But he was clearly dead so I am sure the Board chose not to rub it in. There is a perfectly valid conclusion that ships should be issued with more foxers - along with deployment and cut away guidelines. A cost that is way less than a ship. In fact I read that as a main conclusion. - And you can read part of this report in a very different and officer damning way. The repeated questioning about lifebelts and ropes ends was a way of establishing and confirming that the officers were not running that good a ship in that respect. In concluding and stressing the need to enforce this rule this board was probably doing no more than trying to get home a difficult and hard to enforce point. I used to do with fog drill. In our training we know that if you were run down in fog you had to be wearing a lifebelt to have ANY chance of popping to the surface. Trouble is that they are so damn uncomfortable no one does - especially if sleeping. Statistically we can show in training that wearing one improves your chance of popping to the surface. At sea it takes a VERY strong willed wardroom to enforce the rules. Kite's officers clearly did not. In those days no one wrote a report damning the dead if they could help it. The lessons could be clearly drawn without damning the dead. But anyone reading the report knows what happened. ============== On your point about why were they at Cruising stations… Well it could be that they should not have been - the officers maybe were not that good. However you have to go off Action Stations at some time - even up there in the Arctic and though the war was not won. The tempo of Russian Convoys was clearly diminished from what it had been before. You have to sleep at some point. From the board and seeing what KEPPEL was doing (an A/S sweep) I agree they should probably have still been at least closed up but with hands dispatched to galley for tea and sandwiches (a common way to survive 24 hours at Action Stations in WWII). ============== It seems pretty clear that between 70 and 80 made it into the water. But I am not surprised at the low number picked up. In fact it is a miracle that number were picked up alive. Post World War II analysis of survivors showed that making it into the water and staying afloat was a very small part of the battle to stay alive. A Life Preserver helps - but only a little. It was only in the late 1940's and into the 1950's that hypothermia was recognised as the real killer of many in-water survivors during World War II. Time staying conscious in Arctic water is considered 30-45seconds - then you cannot help yourself. Those who DID make it are very lucky. Note how many said they didn't remember being picked up. Not surprising - this was not their memory getting lost in the stress of the moment - this is the fact they were slipping into unconsciousness and were about to die. 5 did on deck on the KEPPEL. (Most people who died on the Titanic in 1912 did have life preservers on but were considered "drowned". Of course we now know they died of cold). Navies now concentrate on keeping you warm too with immersion suits that can be quickly donned in a very few seconds to give you a chance of staying warm in the water. So even though the Board was hoping to keep people afloat and recognised that a rope end around you made it easier to pull you out - the reality is that it would have been corpses - but the knowledge of the time didn't necessarily recognize that.
KEPPEL reported that by the time they got to the survivors the number they could see had diminished considerably. And here is the one bit that might have been "covered up". The reality was that as soon as you thought you had everyone you could get - you got moving again to avoid the torpedoes possibly headed towards you. Leaving
face down, oil soaked corpses who had just rolled over and died was normal but not generally written about - too distressing for family but well known about if you were there. A belated reply to the above is that Kite's officer's were all "Walkers men" and highly trained but they had to follow the orders of the Captain at that time. If the regular Captain had been in command, I very much doubt that I would have been preparing these pages today.
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Copyright © Mike Kemble
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Copyright © mike kemble Home | Walker RN | U boats | Merseyside | U534 | U344 | |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
